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Executive summary 
Global production systems are organised 
across contractually and geographically 
distributed supply chains. As a consequence 
of this model there exists a ‘governance gap’ 
in global supply chains which results in limited 
regulatory and contractual oversight of 
human rights and labour standards in the 
factories in the lower tiers of production. 
Despite a surge in instruments and initiatives 
designed to address supply chain failures the 
problems persist. 
Supply chain monitoring provides the means 
by which a failure to meet agreed or desired 
standards or processes can be identified and 
appropriate action taken. Traditional 
monitoring models include in-house 
monitoring of codes of conduct undertaken 
by corporate brands, third party auditing and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives.  
Numerous problems with traditional 
monitoring models have been discussed by 
academics and civil society including inherent 
conflicts of interest, the partial, ‘snap-shot’ 
nature of auditing processes, the structural 
problems inherent in distributed supply 
chains which place downward pressure on 
factories who are producing goods and 
components for global brands, the lack of 
appropriate monitoring methodologies to 
protect workers from repercussions if they 
speak out about poor conditions and the lack 
of effective mechanisms through which 
workers can raise grievances and seek 
remedies. 
Our interviews with a small sample of 
representatives from labour rights and 
monitoring organisations build upon existing 
work on the limitations of supply chain 
monitoring and give indications of ways 
forward for the development of more 
effective monitoring models. 
Some of the biggest identified obstacles to 
improving monitoring processes were the 
structural issues and power imbalances 
stemming from the relationship of the lead 
brand to the rest of the supply chain. Factory 
owners face difficulties in acting on the 
findings of monitoring activities because of 
the practical and financial pressures 
stemming from the demands of the lead 
brand such as short lead times and costing 
pressures. A more effective supply chain 
monitoring process necessarily needs to be 
framed around the conditions imposed by 
such sourcing practices and therefore to 
consider structural changes as well as specific 
challenges to compliance with human rights 
and labour standards. 
Interviewees referred to a need for 
monitoring models to go further than 
establishing apparently independent models 
to ensuring that they are truly independent 
and that they are valuable in being able to 
bring about real change. In order to guarantee 
independence, the sometimes blurred 
boundaries between the monitor and the 
monitored need to be clear. 
To move past the prevailing problems with 
auditing and monitoring models the presence 
of the “workers’ voice” was seen as crucial. 
There was a need for transparency, including 
for workers throughout the supply chain to be 
able to know who the other actors in their 
chain are; a need for monitoring processes to 
engage with workers in a meaningful way, 
undertaking worker-sensitive activities 
including opportunities for individual workers 
to raise complaints, interviewing workers off-
site, working with local, independent 
organisations who are trusted by workers, 
and maintaining an ongoing involvement to 
follow up where correction or remediation; 
and, a need to incorporate the workers’ voice 
at a collective level. 
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Introduction 
This policy paper examines the issue of 
monitoring in global supply chains. The 
‘governance gap’ in these supply chains, in 
which there is limited regulatory and 
contractual oversight of standards in the 
lower tiers of production means that it can be 
difficult to secure the human rights of workers 
within given supply chains. Despite a surge in 
instruments and initiatives designed to 
address supply chain failures the problems 
persist. 
The process of monitoring is a critical means 
of identifying human rights violations and 
other failings concerning worker’s health and 
safety and environment standards and 
subsequently holding the violator to account 
or securing remediation for the worker. 
Despite this the models for supply chain 
monitoring and auditing have themselves ben 
subject to criticism and there remains a need 
to develop more satisfactory and effective 
approaches to monitoring.  
As part of the Business, Human Rights and the 
Environment Research Group (BHRE) 
Research Programme we have developed 
work on human rights in global supply chains, 
including undertaking a series of interviews 
with key stakeholders who work with supply 
chain monitors or otherwise directly engage 
in efforts to secure compliance with labour 
standards and human rights in global supply 
chains (see methodology section). This policy 
paper synthesises the insights gained from 
our research and those interviews: first the 
paper focuses on the prevailing models of 
supply chain monitoring and auditing, 
combining insights with our interviews with 
those found in the existing literature to 
provide an account of why these models have 
proven problematic. Second the paper 
focuses on features identified in the course of 
our interviews that might be necessary in the 
development of more effective approaches to 
monitoring. The paper concludes with a series 
of recommendations for brands, civil society 
and academics.  
 
Global supply chains and the 
governance gap 
Global production systems are routinely 
organised across contractually and 
geographically distributed supply chains. This 
organisational model in turn leads to a 
‘governance gap’ in which factories along the 
supply chain manufacture or assemble 
consumable products or components but are 
not in a contractual relationship with the 
company or brand ultimately responsible for 
that product and nor are they regulated 
under the jurisdiction of the countries in 
which these brands are incorporated. 
Consequently, there may be very little 
regulatory oversight of the supply chain as a 
whole and of these geographically and 
contractually distant factories since neither 
the lead brand nor the country of 
incorporation can be relied upon to impose 
standards for workers’ rights and welfare.  
From the 1990s in particular a spotlight was 
shone on human rights abuses in the factories 
or places of work within these supply chains. 
The abuses frequently were identified in the 
lower tiers of production; in factories located 
several production stages away from the 
brand responsible for the goods and from the 
end-user and often in countries in which 
regulation is relatively weak with respect to 
human rights, worker health and safety and 
environmental protection. 
Since the rapid increase in this model of 
production civil society, business enterprises 
and governments have been trying to catch-
up with changes in the way that companies 
operate and are regulated to ensure that 
human rights (as well other social and 
environmental matters) are respected 
throughout the supply chain for a given 
product or company. In this context there has 
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been a surge in initiatives such as corporate 
codes of conduct, industry codes of conduct 
and multi-stakeholder initiatives at domestic, 
industry and global levels which aim to 
establish expectations, guidelines or 
commitments to respecting the rights of 
workers within global supply chains. While 
there are some applicable international 
standards (principally those promulgated by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO)) 
these do not address all relevant issues and 
do themselves rely on adequate 
implementation and enforcement to be 
effective. 
Against this backdrop, monitoring provides 
the means by which a failure to meet agreed 
or desired standards or processes can be 
identified and appropriate action taken. It is 
the mechanism through which human rights 
violations and other failings within the chain 
are discovered, giving rise to an assumption 
that action will be taken to remedy the 
situation (or where appropriate to provide 
compensation or some other form of 
remediation). Monitoring activities may be 
carried out with the aim of enforcing national 
regulation but are often used to verify 
compliance with and enforce private, 
voluntary arrangements such as corporate 
codes of conduct or industry codes. Effective 
monitoring is therefore a critical aspect of any 
effort to protect the rights of workers in 
global supply chains.  
 
Models of supply chain monitoring 
Despite the importance of monitoring as a 
means to ensure that adequate standards in 
supply chains are met much work indicates 
that existing models and initiatives have not 
led to the necessary changes concerning 
respect for human rights within global supply 
chains. 
A range of monitoring models exist which we 
classify here as ‘traditional models’. 
Traditional models may seek to enforce public 
or private standards, especially codes of 
conduct promulgated by multinational 
corporations [(MNCs) who are often the 
‘brands’] or by industry or sector specific 
bodies. Monitoring may be undertaken 
internally, by the brand corporation itself; or 
by – or on behalf of - external third parties 
such as private auditing companies, 
consultants and NGOs. 
Increasingly, traditional models for supply 
chain monitoring have been criticised. There 
is an [emerging] consensus that despite an 
increase in monitoring activity there is little 
evidence that standards have in fact improved 
and violations of labour standards, human 
rights (and environmental problems) continue 
to be frequently identified and reported on.  If 
existing systems were working well then it 
should be possible to establish this but that 
has not been the case. i  The various 
traditional models each present important 
limitations: 
 
‘IN-HOUSE’ MONITORING involves the lead 
brand setting expectations or standards on its 
suppliers and making its own arrangements 
for monitoring them. This model is seen as 
problematic because both the lead brand and 
the supplier have a business-interest in hiding 
violations -- or at least minimising their 
visibility -- rather than reporting them.ii In 
addition, as with paid-for third party auditing 
(below), monitoring undertaken by companies 
or industry associations may be perceived as 
unreliable: 
We’re not going to trust for-profit 
monitoring organizations that do 
factory visits, and we’re not going to 
trust industry dominating groups, like 
WRAP, the Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Procurement….There’s too 
many conflicts of interest. You can’t 
have the industry monitoring itself 
because, lo and behold, they say 
everything is fine. They don’t catch 
problems. They don’t do the 
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investigations the right way…There’s 
basic standards of how you do this 
investigation with a worker 
perspective in mind, that the industry 
does not have. The industry has a 
management perspective in mind. 
They want to help the management 
pass their audit” (interview 3). 
 
In our interviews, the potential conflict 
between company sourcing practices and the 
ability to carry out effective monitoring was 
also highlighted. For example,  
“Once an investigation is done, there 
may be obvious recommendations on 
how to address it, but inevitably some 
of those recommendations have to do 
with changes in the practice of the 
brand. That can be tricky because 
brands can see it as a challenge to 
change the way they do business and 
remain competitive because the 
principle driving motivation is to make 
profit for their shareholders” 
(interview 2).  
Consequently, structural issues such as 
sourcing practices including pressure on lead-
times may not be incorporated into the 
monitoring process or may act as a barrier to 
change even if they are incorporated. 
Moreover, there can be an internal tension 
for businesses since effective monitoring 
mechanisms imply costs to maintain as well as 
giving rise to further costs where action is 
required (highlighted in interview 1 and see 
further below: addressing brand influence) 
 
‘THIRD PARTY’ AUDITING introduces an 
additional party into the monitoring process, 
with an external auditing firm or organisation 
carrying out a compliance audit on behalf of a 
company, industry group (or, potentially, a 
public body or other organisation). Third party 
auditing has become a very widely used 
model to verify compliance, or identify non-
compliance, in a supply chain site or factory. 
Although it is perhaps the most prevalent 
verification model, ‘social auditing’ of this 
kind has started to be viewed negatively as a 
result of several recognised failings. One of 
the most notorious of these was the 
successful audit of the Rana Plaza factory in 
Bangladesh soon before it collapsed killing 
over one thousand garment factory workers. 
This incident highlighted one of the most 
frequently cited failings of social auditing; the 
‘tick box’ and ‘snap shot’ nature of the 
process which provides only a limited picture 
of conditions at a particular factory.  
Again there is a perceived conflict of interest 
when auditors report to the lead brand since 
they have an interest in maintaining a good 
relationship with them and keeping their 
business. Questions are therefore raised 
about whether these bodies can really be 
considered independent - concerns which 
were reiterated in our own interviews. For 
example 
 “when a company relies on buying 
information about the compliance at 
the workplace – that means that it is 
either the brand or the manufacturer 
is paying an auditing firm to go in and 
do an audit. And that auditor is 
required to clock time and have his or 
her hours paid for and hopefully get 
the business [of] that company 
again”. (Interview 2)  
Other interviews identified concerns over the 
growth and management of social auditors as 
an industry. 
In addition to the conflict of interest and 
demands on auditing firms operating as a 
business, the practices of auditing firms have 
also been criticized as inadequate for 
identifying genuine problems. Factory visits 
may be too infrequent to provide a realistic 
evaluation of the situation and the process of 
auditing can even have detrimental outcomes 
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for workers; it has been observed that 
auditing can result in problems simply being 
shifted further along the supply chain, to the 
next tier that is outside the reach of the 
audit.iii For those workers who are involved in 
the audit, inappropriate practices may leave 
them vulnerable to repercussions from 
management personnel. These issues again 
were raised in our interviews, which 
highlighted for example problems such as 
interviewing workers onsite and in conditions 
in which they may fear adverse consequences 
from speaking honestly. For instance, 
“…They don’t do the investigations 
the right way. You have to, for 
instance, interview workers away 
from the factory at home, with an 
interpreter and in their native 
language, not with managers. Basic 
things like that. You have to have 
people that have a worker right 
orientation, and not simply a checklist 
that they want to get through in three 
hours. You need to, if possible, tour 
the factory, without giving managers 
weeks notices so that they can clean 
some things up.” (Interview 3) 
 
MULTISTAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES: Criticisms 
of third party monitoring are not confined to 
private sector auditing firms but can also 
extend to multi-stakeholder and other 
collaborative voluntary initiatives. Such 
initiatives can vary in their approach and 
composition; some are completely 
independent from industry while others are 
based upon a more collaborative model. The 
monitoring and verification operations of 
initiatives such as the Fair Labour Association 
(FLA), SA8000, and WRAP (Worldwide 
Responsible Apparel Procurement) have been 
criticised for their lack of transparency and 
because they may be viewed as being 
dominated by business interests - these 
criticisms were repeated in our interviews.  
“What we find in [some] models of 
[multi-stakeholder initiatives] that 
have inspecting, first of all, it's not 
independent, in the sense that there 
are quality control firms or auditing 
firms. The billions of dollars in that 
industry alone, they get all of their 
money from the people who they're 
doing the inspection for, whether it's 
the brand at the top or the supplier 
that's actually got the workplace that 
they're running. These companies… 
they live off of this phenomenon. I 
think that that's a lot of money, and it 
corrupts what they do, and it's a 
growth industry” (interview 4). 
This interviewee also described the inherent 
tension that is present in multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, because of the range of positions 
represented, and the consequent need for 
appropriate mechanisms which are triggered 
when that tension cannot be resolved - 
Fair Labour Association 
The FLA is a multi-stakeholder initiative; 
its Board of Directors comprises an 
independent chair and proportionally 
equal representation from companies, 
NGO representatives and University 
representatives. The work of the FLA is 
not limited to a single sector. It publishes 
a Code of Conduct which is to be followed 
by participating companies and 
Compliance Benchmarks and the FLA’s 
Principles of Monitoring provide the 
framework for compliance and 
enforcement. The Code of Conduct and 
Principles of Monitoring are described as 
‘statements of principle’.1 The principles 
of monitoring provide guidance on how 
assessments are to be undertaken 
including by working with local 
organisations to identify issues and 
determine appropriate techniques for 
information gathering and guidance on 
interviewing workers and management 
and undertaking visual inspections. The 
FLA accredits organisations and individual 
assessors for its External Assessment 
program and publishes details of those 
accredited on its website.1 
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something which was considered to be 
missing from most existing initiatives:  
“If you have a real multi-stakeholder 
initiative, you have to have some 
tension there, because people don't 
have all the same positions and 
interests. If you don't have that 
tension, then you probably don't have 
a real multi-stakeholder initiative. If 
you have a real one, there's going to 
eventually be an incident, an issue, an 
event, in which the internal workings 
of the MSI can't get to a solution. At 
that point, you have to have an exit. 
What SAI and FLA do not have, and 
none of the ones that I'm talking 
about here, they don't have a place 
where you say, “We couldn't reconcile 
this issue with our internal structures 
of meetings and grievances, and 
whatever structures we've set up, so 
we're going to go to binding 
arbitration outside of this MSI”” 
(interview 4).  
The Bangladesh Accord (see box) and 
Indonesia Protocol on Freedom of Association 
were cited as examples of better practice 
which do include such an ‘exit’. 
 
INDEPENDENT MONITORING: In light of the 
criticisms of the models above, there may be 
increased interest in ‘independent’ 
monitoring processes which seek to avoid 
both the conflicts of interest and potentially 
detrimental and limited verification processes 
that have been the subject of criticism. In 
these initiatives the lead brands or other 
private sector interests are not represented in 
the governance or operational structures of 
the initiatives. Such independent 
organisations may be seen as “more 
accountable and trustworthy” (interview 4) - 
contrasting with company and industry 
initiatives that are seen to involve conflicts of 
interest. One of the most widely recognised 
and positively viewed examples of 
independent monitoring is that of the Worker 
Rights Consortium (WRC). The recently 
launched Electronics Watch initiative is also 
based upon a similar approach to 
independent monitoring.  
Worker Rights Consortium 
The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) is described as an independent labor rights monitoring 
organization which aims combat sweatshops and protect the rights of workers who make apparel 
and other products. The WRC conducts independent investigations of apparel factories and provides 
assistance to workers in those factories in securing their labour rights. WRC is an affiliate 
organisation comprised predominantly of university and college affiliates and with a focus on the 
labor practices of factories that make university-related apparel. 
 
The governance structure comprises representatives of the University Caucus, independent labour 
rights experts representing the WRC Advisory Council, and representatives of United Students 
Against Sweatshops. WRC undertakes factory investigations in response to worker complaints as well 
as “initiates investigations on a proactive basis.”1 
 
WRC monitoring activities include conducting interviews with workers in their homes and 
communities (rather than in the factories where they work), interviews with plant managers, local 
government labor authorities, relevant labor union officials, local academic and legal experts, and 
other ‘relevant parties’, visual inspections, where permitted by factory managers, and review of 
relevant records, documents and supplementental scholarly and/or journalistic materials.  
 
Monitoring investigations seek to assess compliance with applicable codes of conduct - a model code 
is made available to affiliates by WRC. When violations are identified recommendations are made 
for remedial action to factory management. Reports are published on the WRC website. WRC “works 
with U.S. apparel companies who are procuring goods from the factory in question to encourage the 
implementation of these recommendations”. Where companies are not active in taking remedial 
steps WRC reports the fact to its affiliates. 
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Independent processes are not however 
immune to criticism, for example there can be 
concerns that NGOs will be ‘co-opted’ by 
corporations or about the quality of auditing.iv 
A further limitation identified (interview 3) 
concerns funding: independent organisations 
such as those seeking to incorporate 
monitoring as part of an initiative to raise 
supply chain standards, may lack the 
necessary funding to carry out monitoring 
activities, even where this is viewed as a 
potentially important aspect of their work. 
There may be a tension between the need for 
adequate funding to undertake investigations 
and the ability and willingness of members or 
affiliates to pay fees. 
 
Towards effective supply chain 
monitoring 
Whilst a consistent view is emerging of the 
limitations of existing models, perspectives on 
how these limitations can be overcome and 
on options for new models of monitoring are 
less developed in the relevant literature and 
reports. In the interviews discussed in this 
paper certain factors and themes can be 
identified which add to this discussion and 
which are not yet as well documented: 
 
Addressing brand-influence  
Taking a top-down approach, some of the 
biggest identified obstacles to improving 
monitoring processes remain the structural 
issues and power imbalances stemming from 
the relationship of the lead brand to the rest 
of the supply chain. Whilst these have been 
implicated in existing work as causal factors in 
human rights failings, the present interviews 
identify them also as barriers to effective 
monitoring. Interviewees noted that factory 
owners faced difficulties in acting on the 
findings of monitoring activities because of 
the practical and financial pressures 
stemming from the demands of the lead 
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building 
Safety in Bangladesh  
The Bangladesh Accord was signed on 
May 15th 2013. It is described as a 
legally binding, independent agreement 
between global brands and retailers and 
trade unions. The governance structure 
includes equal weighting between brands 
and union representatives as well 
‘witness signatories’ from the Clean 
Clothes Campaign and the WRC and an 
Independent Director. Disputes are to be 
decided by majority vote with appeals 
subject to binding arbitration. 
The work programme of the Accord 
includes inspections and remediation. 
Inspections are undertaken by qualified 
safety engineers with factories inspected 
against the Accord building standards. 
Provisions of the Accord establish 
requirements for the independence of 
inspectors. Reports are shared with 
factory owners, signatory companies and 
union representatives. The factory 
owner and company are subsequently to 
develop a Corrective Action Plan, 
detailing remedial steps to be taken. 
The Accord aims to protect workers for 
example by requiring that employees 
continue to be paid in the event that a 
factory is temporarily closed for the 
purpose of remediation work. Further 
the Accord aims to induce brands to 
negotiate commercial terms with their 
factories which mean that it is 
financially feasible to operate safe 
workplaces and engage in remediation 
when required. The Accord incorporates 
steps for transparency, publishing the 
inspection reports on its website.  
The Accord requires that suppliers 
designate factories producing on their 
behalf as Tier 1, Tier 2, or tier 3 
depending on their contribution, by 
volume, to the company’s annual 
production in Bangladesh. Inspection 
demands decrease down the supply 
chain. The Accord incorporates steps for 
transparency including publishing 
inspection reports on its website and 
requiring companies to disclose their 
supply chain including sub-contractors. 
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brand such as short lead times and costing 
pressures (interview 1, interview 2, interview 
4). Such pressures can leave little scope to act 
on the findings of monitoring or auditing 
reports. Even where commitments to 
monitoring are made by the brands, acting on 
the findings of monitoring processes requires 
a commitment to change practices which also 
has financial implications and this investment 
may not be forthcoming (interview 1). 
Similarly, while the corporate responsibility 
division of a company may commit to change, 
other aspects of the company, such as 
purchasing divisions or obligations owed to 
shareholders (interview 2) act against this 
interest. The corollary to this was the 
emphasis by interviewees that it is within the 
power of the lead brands to change 
expectations (or demands) so that failings are 
acted upon. Consequently, to be effective 
monitoring efforts cannot operate completely 
in isolation and without reference to the 
context in which production takes place. 
Monitoring processes may identify specific 
failings or problems - or confirm compliance - 
but they usually do not link these into the 
broader framework of the sourcing practices 
which can lead to non-compliance or poor 
working conditions. A more effective supply 
chain monitoring process necessarily needs to 
be framed around the conditions imposed by 
such sourcing practices and therefore to 
consider structural changes as well as specific 
challenges to compliance with human rights 
and labour standards. An ancillary point, 
emphasised in some interviews, was the need 
to make effective use of existing laws in the 
country in which the brand is incorporated 
since in some case there are opportunities to 
address supply chain conditions but the 
legislation is little known or rarely utilised 
(separately from the problems of lack of 
enforcement in the countries of operation) 
(interviews 2, 5). 
 
 
Seeking independence and securing 
change 
Given the context of brand-led influence and 
downward production pressures in tandem 
with the limitations in traditional monitoring 
models discussed above, interviewees 
referred to a need for monitoring models to 
go further than establishing apparently 
independent models to ensuring that they are 
truly independent and that they are valuable 
in being able to bring about real change. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that private social 
auditing on the whole is not well-placed to 
achieve change our interviews also raise 
concerns about whether change can be 
achieved given the wider environment and 
the range of stakeholders involved in supply 
chain monitoring.  
In order to guarantee independence, the 
boundaries between the monitor and the 
monitored need to be clear. The blurred 
boundaries which exist in this sector are an 
important barrier. In one interview (interview 
1) there were strong concerns that in the 
“growth industry” of monitoring and 
auditing, organisations were being 
established which were not truly independent 
or indeed separate from the suppliers or 
brands they worked with, although they 
purported to be. Similarly, interview 3 raised 
concerns about the move from non-profit to 
for-profit for organisations involved in supply 
chain inspections.v Such concerns sit 
alongside those related to the conflicts of 
interest that can be perceived where 
businesses are represented in the governance 
structures of monitoring bodies; (interviews 2, 
3, 4).  
Leverage and the capacity to influence change 
are too essential instruments in seeking a 
more effective monitoring process. Interview 
1 noted that many small independent 
monitoring organisations have been 
established (for example in China) but it was 
questionable whether they had any real 
capacity (for instance, taking into account 
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their size, resources and methods) to 
influence the brands or companies. If this is 
the case then there may be wasted resources 
on the one hand, in engaging with 
such organisations or, on the other hand, 
their engagement could again feed into 
perceptions of monitoring as a corporate PR 
tool. In a similar respect, interview 3 noted 
that independent organisations seeking to 
promote responsible purchasing and which 
incorporate monitoring mechanisms may in 
reality have limited capacity and there is  
therefore a need for a critical mass [through 
membership/affiliation fees] to make 
activities viable.   
 
Incorporating workers’ voices 
More specifically, to move past the prevailing 
problems with auditing and monitoring 
models the presence of the “workers’ 
voice” in various regards was seen as crucial; 
this was noted by interviewee 2 as the 
“biggest missing piece” of the puzzle. The 
need for workers to play a role in fulfilling 
rights and [addressing] violations was seen 
here as a way to counter-balance the conflict 
of interest seen in other approaches to 
monitoring. Interview 3 commented on the 
need for workers to be represented in the 
governance structures of organisations 
involved in supply chain monitoring and in 
interview 3 and 4 WRC was cited again as an 
example of best practice on the basis, since it 
includes workers but does not include 
corporations in its governance structure and 
because its inspections are independent and 
follow a worker sensitive approach (see box). 
Interviews 2, 3 and 4 noted the need for 
opportunities for grievances or disputes to be 
dealt with in a way which incorporated 
workers voices and interests. vi Interview 4 
considered that grievance mechanisms must 
be worker-driven and Interview 2 also noted 
that effective models, since they would 
include different interests, would sometimes 
result in tensions and that there would 
therefore be a need to refer disputes to some 
form of binding arbitration. Interviewees 3 
and 4 referred in positive terms to the 
development of the Bangladesh Accord as 
model in which this type of mechanism was 
incorporated.   
Transparency in supply chains is a key 
element to identifying human rights violations 
and devising processes to address them. It 
was also noted in our interviews, including in 
the need for workers throughout the supply 
chain to be able to know who the other actors 
in their chain are, including the brand(s) for 
whom they ultimately work (interview 2). 
Similarly, there was an identified need for 
transparency to extend further than the first 
tier of production (interview 3). As well as the 
need for means of dealing with disputes at 
this level, interviewees discussed the need for 
monitoring processes to engage with workers 
in a meaningful way. One way of achieving 
this was through undertaking worker-
sensitive activities; again WRC was seen by 
interviewees as the ‘gold standard’ here 
because of its approach to engaging with 
workers directly (rather than acting on the 
basis of management information, for 
instance, or simple auditing snapshots). This 
approach includes opportunities for workers 
to raise complaints, interviewing workers off-
site, working with local, independent 
organisations who are trusted by workers, 
and maintaining an ongoing involvement to 
follow up where correction or remediation is 
needed. 
Focusing on the collective capacity of 
workers, the ability of workers 
to organise and the role of freedom of 
association was repeatedly identified as a 
prerequisite for effective monitoring, given 
the need to access workers and gain 
a ‘true’ picture of conditions in a given 
workplace (interviews 1, 2, 3, 4).  
Building on these shortcomings and 
opportunities is the first step to developing a 
next generation of monitoring processes and 
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methodology. One that not only has workers 
at its core but that allows for them to drive it 
in order to address their own needs in the 
context of production.  
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Recommendations 
Brands:  
• Participate in monitoring processes 
which are verifiably independent  
• Commit to acting on the findings of 
monitoring processes (regardless of 
which process are being followed) 
• Work with factory owners and suppliers 
to ensure that sourcing demands do 
not compromise the ability of factories 
to act on findings of monitoring 
activities 
 
NGOs and civil society: 
• Participate in and advocate for 
monitoring models which incorporate 
workers’ voices including in their 
governance structures 
• Highlight failings in existing monitoring 
models and examples of good practice 
• Work to empower workers to develop 
and drive forward their own oversight 
and participation mechanisms 
 
Researchers and academics: 
• Undertake further research to 
understand better how the highlighted 
issues, including structural and power 
issues, true independence and capacity 
for change and workers’ voice(s) can be 
incorporated into new and more 
effective monitoring approaches. 
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Methodology 
This policy paper is part of the wider project 
on Worker-driven monitoring, part of the 
BHRE Human Rights in Global Supply Chains 
Research Programme.  
The research summarised in this paper is 
based on fieldwork undertaken in 2015 by Dr 
Opi Outhwaite on responsible public 
procurement and supply chain monitoring 
and reform.  The work was undertaken in the 
USA where the stakeholders identified were 
based. Since this phase of work formed part 
of a larger, ongoing, project the interviewees 
were purposefully sampled to target an 
expert population based on their identified 
relevance to the research questions. Five 
interviews were carried out for this phase of 
work, all involving structured interviews.  All 
interviewees were representatives of NGOs, 
associations, or other institutions which 
worked on issues of supply chain monitoring 
and labour rights but not all carried out 
monitoring themselves. As well as addressing 
specific research questions his phase of 
fieldwork presented an opportunity to 
identify ‘gatekeepers’ who would inform the 
next phase of research. 
Since participants were selected on the basis 
of their relevance to the area of study there 
are inherent limitations with respect to the 
particular perspectives represented. There 
are a relatively small number of relevant 
organisations in this area which means some 
degree of ‘cross-fertilisation’ of experts occurs 
between organisations. Given that all of the 
sampled organisations are involved with 
labour rights in some capacity, this inevitably 
colours the perspectives presented. These 
perspectives were actively sought for the 
purpose of the work presented in this policy 
paper but this overall limitation on 
perspective should be borne in mind by the 
reader.  
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